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Book Review
The Birth of Tragedy, by Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by Clifton P. Fadiman. New York: Dover
Publications, 1995. 92 pp. No bibliography or index. ISBN 0-486-28515-4. Dover Thrift Editions, $1.
Few books in order to be understood properly have to be reinserted into their historical, cultural and
personal context as crucially as does Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy (BT). A mere account of its
themes does not begin to explain the meaning of the book to its author, his contemporaries or later
generations. Nietzsche had been trained as a classical philologist and thanks to his reputation as the most
brilliant young student in the field, was made a professor at the University of Basel even before being
awarded his doctorate. Everyone expected this, his first book, to be a triumph, the first of many in his
career. But instead it provoked a storm throughout the scholarly world, was almost universally
condemned, and effectively ended Nietzsche’s scholarly career at its very commencement. How could he
have gone so wrong so quickly? What could he have been thinking?
Nietzsche was willing to risk being a failure as a philologist because success in that field was the least of
his ambitions. Not historical correctness but the deeper truth that lay beneath history – classical or
otherwise – and culture as its creative source was the focus of his very impassioned and wide-ranging
inquiry. This was ostensibly a book about the origins of Greek tragedy as an art form, but Nietzsche’s
passion for the genuine source of all phenomena immediately led him beyond a narrow, conservative
approach to his material and instead into a quasi-metaphysical plunge into the subterranean forces that
mold all art and creativity. It can scarcely be surprising today that the very audacity of his thinking,
regardless of its consequences, would have been radically unacceptable to his traditionalistic colleagues.
His reflections on the evolution of Attic art forms were influenced far more by the philosophies of
Schopenhauer and Hegel and the operatic achievement and theories of (his friend and mentor) Richard
Wagner than by his immediate scholarly predecessors. As a result, it was publication of this book in
1872, at the very beginning of his career, that for all practical purposes ended it and made him an
academic outcaste.
At the time of his writing experts on Greek culture agreed that it marked the supreme expression of
human artistic achievement, the heights of the possibilities of human nature for rational ordering of its
destiny and its world. Goethe was foremost among those who celebrated its “noble simplicity, calm
grandeur,” while Matthew Arnold later epitomized it in a phrase now become famous as pure “sweetness
and light.” Nietzsche freely acknowledged that the rationalistic component of human nature reached
supreme form in classical Greece; his originality, however, was to insist that behind it and opposing it
stood another equally powerful component, the human capacity for irrationality. Nor was he prepared to
insist that the latter must always be prepared to submit to the claims and mastery of reason and control,
for he saw as few had before him the creative and positive potential of the orgiastic to culture and
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growth. In these ways BT may appropriately be read as one of the harbingers of the irrationalism that
characterizes the perspective of such twentieth-century icons as Freud, as well as the savagery of the
World Wars that destroyed the idolatry of reason by the middle of the century.
Within the classical context of his analysis Nietzsche is prompted to term man’s rationalistic energies
“Apollonian” and their contrary “Dionysian.” He describes their confrontation as one of “tremendous
opposition,” but nevertheless one that is capable of reconciliation, regarding classical Greek tragedy as a
foremost example of such a synthesis. Nietzsche proposes that each may best be understood as a
manifestation of specific types of human experience, notably dreaming and frenzy. Apollo, the god of
reason and restraint, may be regarded as the patron of form: in the first place the forms spontaneously
generated in dreams, but in a larger sense individual form as such, and even the individual as such –
individuation. But it is in this very fragmentation of “this basis of all existence – the Dionysian
substratum of the world” (91) that is responsible for the “Dionysian suffering” that characterizes all
existence: men are irrevocably separated from each other and from their eternal source. The Dionysian
rituals that are incorporated in later forms of Attic drama incorporate and commemorate this sacrificial
tearing apart of their sponsor, Dionysus.
How is it then that the Greeks, who “knew and felt the terror and horror of existence” (8) long before
Christianity’s faith in salvation through Jesus Christ proposed to obviate such fears, did not succumb to
the depths of pessimism about life? It was only, Nietzsche contends, by turning to Apollo, the
representative of “the primordial joy of appearance” (14), the god of beautiful illusions, that they were
enabled not merely to survive but to celebrate the joyousness of being. “I feel myself impelled to the
metaphysical assumption that the Truly-Existent and Primal Unity, eternally suffering and divided against
itself, has need of the rapturous vision, the joyful appearance, for its continuous salvation” (10). In BT art
and the experience of beauty replaces religion as the means by which man’s being may be affirmed.
The arguments in sections 1-10 of BT summarize Nietzsche‘s analysis of the development and
significance of Greek tragedy. In sections 11-15 he turns to equally provocative and stimulating theses
regarding its decline in the Hellenistic period. Its decadence, he argues, is to be laid at the feet of
Euripides, Socrates and the Socratic rationalists, those who could no longer appreciate, dignify or ennoble
the tragedy inherent in life, but who – oblivious to the ineluctability of human suffering – believed
naively in the ability of theoretical reason to comprehend and somehow solve practically the pain
inherent in existence. They believed that through the knowledge derived from the arguments and counter-
arguments of rigorous rational dialectic the harsh realities of existence could somehow be avoided or
eliminated. They blindly trusted “the Socratic maxims: ‘Virtue is knowledge; man sins only from
ignorance; he who is virtuous is happy’” (50). Finally, in the naïve, superficial optimism of the period,
emphasizing reason only in its technical, utilitarian uses, while refusing to consider the obdurate realities
of life , Nietzsche finds the ancestor of the scientism of modern period, equally prepared to believe that
there must be a technological fix to all sources of human suffering. The solution for such resolute
blindness, Nietzsche claims, can only lie in the regeneration of an authentic art, the cultivation of a
courage in which a “new form of insight rises to view, namely tragic perception, which in order merely
to be endured, requires art as protection and remedy” (55).
Nietzsche later added ten additional sections (16-25) to these fifteen. In the Translator’s Introduction to
his own translation of the BT, Walter Kaufmann accurately refers to them as “less worthy of Nietzsche
than anything else of comparable length he ever published” (13). They cover once again much of the
ground already surveyed in the previous version of the book, but in a very much more diffuse, confusing
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and aimless manner. Their principal purpose was to exalt German culture generally and in particular
Nietzsche‘s principal enthusiasm at this time, his older friend, composer Richard Wagner, as the
particular expression of the regeneration of authentic art that he had called for in the conclusion of section
15. In these he finds “the gradual awakening of the Dionysian spirit in our modern world!” (72). The
work as a whole is dedicated to Wagner, with whom he would shortly break over the latter’s embrace of
nationalistic, Christian and anti-Semitic ideologies.
This edition by Dover Publications is a reproduction of one of the earliest English translations of
Nietzsche’s BT, that of Clifton Fadiman, an American man-of-letters who was only a graduate student in
New York when commissioned to undertake the work (released in 1927). It’s principal recommendation
is its cost – only $1. As a translation, however, it is quite defensible; indeed, in the Notes preceding his
edition, Kaufmann acknowledges his close dependence on the Fadiman version. Nevertheless, for those
prepared to spend only a little extra, the Kaufmann edition is much preferable. It appends not only
Nietzsche’s last thoughts on Wagner, The Case of Wagner, published just before his death, but even
more importantly Kaufmann’s very useful Introduction and Nietzsche‘s own “Attempt at a Self-
Criticism,” written by him some fifteen years later, in which he takes issue with many of his own most
fundamental claims in BT.
For some decades students of Nietzsche, such as Kaufmann, R. J. Hollingdale, Richard Schacht, Gilles
Deleuze and many others, have been relatively certain about the significance of his claims in the BT, and
in particular the contrast between the meaning of the Dionysian in that and succeeding works. For nearly
all scholars its discontinuity with Nietzsche’s later philosophical themes has been axiomatic, but more
recently that certainty has been challenged. Like myself, James I. Porter (“The Invention of Dionysus and
the Platonic Midwife: Nietzsche’s ‘Birth of Tragedy,’” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 33, 3 [July,
1995], 467-97) also argues the need for a fresh interpretation of BT. And like myself, Porter wishes to
soften the contrast between BT and Nietzsche’s subsequent writings; but whereas he is inclined to read
BT in the light of Nietzsche’s later thinking, I argue (“Nietzsche/Dionysus: Ecstasy, Heroism and the
Monstrous,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 21 [Spring, 2001], 1-26) for the reverse: that the dualism of BT
between the Apollonian and the Dionysian continues to inform Nietzsche’s thought throughout his
writings. Far from being an anomaly in the early Nietzsche, confined to this volume alone, it pervades
his thinking as a whole.
Additionally, and as importantly, the standard scholarly understanding of the Dionysian in BT has been
skewed almost entirely towards the negative. The received account repeats endlessly Nietzsche‘s notion
that the dismemberment of the Dionysian core of being leads to the concept of the Dionysian as
synonymous with suffering. What it consistently ignores is Nietzsche’s equal insistence here and
elsewhere upon Dionysian ecstasy, an element in his thought whose implications are seldom
acknowledged. In a sample passage that is seldom quoted, Nietzsche asserts that “Dionysian art, too,
wishes to convince us of the eternal joy of existence: only we are to seek this joy not in phenomena, but
behind them. We are to recognize that all that comes into being must be ready for a sorrowful end; we
are forced to look into the terrors of the individual existence – yet we are not to become rigid with fear: a
metaphysical comfort tears us momentarily from the bustle of the transforming figures…. We have
become, as it were, one with the infinite primordial joy in existence…. In spite of fear and pity, we are




In this last statement Nietzsche’s often cited metaphysical assumption that the primal cosmic unity is
eternally suffering and contradictory is temporarily abrogated, for he now affirms a quite opposite
metaphysical assumption: that the primal state of all existing beings is not suffering at all but ecstasy. By
means of Dionysian art (most particularly music, especially Wagnerian music) we are enabled to gain
access to this aboriginal ecstasy of existence; via its rituals we are enabled to go behind phenomena, to
have direct access to their – to our own – metaphysical source. “In [Dionysian] song and dance man...
feels himself a god, he himself now walks about enchanted, in ecstasy...” (4). Through Dionysian tragedy
“the gulfs between man and man give way to an overwhelming feeling of unity leading back to the very
heart of nature. The metaphysical comfort – with which, as I have here intimated, every true tragedy
leaves us – [reveals] that despite the flux of phenomena, life at bottom is indestructibly powerful and
pleasurable” (22).
Soon after BT, Nietzsche will come to reject the possibility of a Dionysian or any other explicit form of
metaphysics, but throughout his thought he never comes to doubt the core metaphysical intuition upon
which it is based, the deepest essence of the Dionysian experience itself: that whatever the sufferings of
the individual life, the core of being consists in ecstasy, some aboriginal and invincible joy. It comes to
constitute for Nietzsche the unanswerable objection to Schopenhauer and all other forms of pessimism
and the basis for his lifelong dedication to the affirmation of life. What was more problematic was
whether the essence of that pleasure consisted in (the Dionysian of BT) mystical immersion in nature, or,
on the contrary, the personal exercise of power over weaker others – sketched originally in the aesthetic
creativity of the artist-hero of BT (there dubbed Apollonian), but thereafter in the will-to-power of the
Higher-Man (Ubermensch; now, confusingly, also described as Dionysian) in various modalities of
culture.
Throughout Nietzsche’s philosophy subsequent to BT he continued to consider the Dionysian and
Apollonian “energies,” but with vastly more confusion, for henceforth both respond to the banner of
Dionysus. After BT, that is, the name “Apollo” – though by no means the notions, values and attitudes
based on conflict that he represented; i.e., the heroic negation of the negation of the world itself – is
abandoned and Dionysus, at first the epitome of the experience of ecstatic union with the innermost
depths of the world, is alone made to symbolize both contraries in the relation. But this is done without
the overt recognition that we found in BT: that they are contraries; that the state between them is one, as
Nietzsche originally phrased it, of “tremendous opposition.” The cost of this external philosophical
unification (Kaufmann describes the result as the “monism of the will to power”), however, was serious
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